


シンポジウム報告

Japan's Response to the Rise of China

Seiichiro Takagi (JIIA)

Percentage



Source: Cabinet Office, "Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy", (in Japanese), October, 2012, accessible at <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h24/h24-gaiko/zh/z10.html>

Figure1 : Feelings of Affinity with China

1. Popular Attitude

*Beginning of the marked deterioration: 2004

- Spectator behavior at the Asia Cup soccer games in China

*Continued deterioration: Succession of negative news from China

*Not knee-jerk reactions to the rise of China per-se but indirectly related to the rise

*Reaction to Chinese behavior which reflects various aspects of the rise

2. Tourism

*Sharp decrease since September 2012: Anti-Japanese atmosphere, air pollution

*2013 (2,877.5 thousand, 18.2% decrease from 2012)

3. Investment in China

*January to July 2014: 45.4% decrease from the same period in 2013

*2013 (\$7.064 billion) : 4.28% decrease from 2012

- Political atmosphere

- Rising wages

- Rapid economic growth in alternative destinations: China+1

Investment in ASEAN in 2013: 121.3% increase from 2012

4. Political and security policy

1) Robert Coper's trichotomy of states

*Robert Cooper, *Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*, New York: Grove Press, 2003.

*Japan's post-modern inclination

Self-restraint on military development, Lack of territorial ambition

Avoidance of use of force, Acceptance of intrusive inspection, Universal value orientation, Multilateralism

*Japan's difficulty: surrounded by modern states (Cooper, p.41) , esp. China

*“...if China develops in an unpromising fashion ... Japan could be forced to revert to defensive modernism.” (ibid.)

2) China's “unpromising” behavior

* Assertive behavior since 2009

* Japan as the target: Senkaku 1 (2010), Senkaku 2 (2012)

3) Japan's "re-modernization": incremental <-resistance from post-modern inclination

(1) Initial steps by the DPJ government

* Conceptual evolution on defense capability

- "Dynamic defense capability" (2010 NDPG, December 2010)

Departure from the "base defense capability" concept

* Deployment to the Southwestern Islands

* Gradual strengthening of the alliance with the U. S.

- Operation Tomodachi (2011)

- 2+2 (April 2012) : "Dynamic defense cooperation"

- Agreement to revise the Defense Cooperation Guideline (August 2012)

(2) Modest advancement by the Abe administration

* Reversal of annual reduction of defense expenditure (FY 2013)

* Institutional development of national security policy-making (December 2013)

- National Security Council

- National Security Strategy: "Proactive contribution to peace"

* 2013 NDPG (Dec.) : "Integrated dynamic defense capability," "grey-zone situation"

* Specially Designated Secret Protection Law (December 2013)

* Three Principles of Defense Equipment Export (April 2014)

* Strengthening of the alliance with the U. S.

- Abe's visit to Washington (February 2013)

- 2+2 (October 2013): Beginning of the revision of Defense Cooperation Guideline

- Obama's state visit to Tokyo (April 2014)

- Reinterpretation of Article 9 (July 2014) : Collective self-defense

- Interim report on the new Defense Cooperation Guideline (October 2014)