

プロジェクト報告

China's Foreign Policy in Polish Crisis and Hungarian Revolt

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1. Introduction

In 1956, the communist camp was facing a crisis under Cold War structure. Beginning with the “secret speech” delivered by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) Twentieth Congress, from June to October, revolts broke out in Poland and Hungary by workers and citizens, and it gave a severely negative influence to the communist regimes in East Europe. To avoid further internal crisis, the review of previous policies were implemented in Poland and Hungary, and it eventually led to the dynamic political and military intervention of CPSU and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the case of Poland, when Soviet Union initialed a plan to intervene into Warsaw by force, CCP strongly objected it and pushed a peace solution to Poland event. While in the case of Hungary, when Soviet Union was facing a difficult decision whether to intervene into Budapest on October 30, a turning point of the revolt, CCP insisted a hardline to solve the Hungary’s problems by military intervention by Soviet Union’s army. Although Poland and Hungary originally attempted to guard an individual approach against the repressiveness of Soviet Union’s in essence, CCP gave alternative solutions towards the two cases to CPSU.

Along the opening archives of CPSU and CCP these years, CCP’s role in Hungary revolt has been a hot topic in the research of Cold War history¹⁾, and the previous

1) See SHEN Zhihua (2005) “the October crisis in Poland, 1956, the role and influence of

studies usually focus on CCP's perception of changing position in the Communist camp between CPSU and CCP. According to several studies, the strategies of CCP in Polish crisis and Hungarian revolt were considered to be a challenge to CPSU's prestige in the communist camp, especially by paying attention to the issue of the "anti-chauvinism" of CCP²⁾. However, in this study, the author's argument is that CCP's foreign policy towards Poland and Hungary was less that the challenge of the authority of CPSU, than a tactic to protect the "individual line led by the communist party (In this research, The author uses "individual line" to put it simply)" in China and East Europe, in order to adapt a flexible approach to the construction of the domestic politics and economy, which was aimed at the improvement of the people's living standards and state power in these countries.

In this research, Chapter 1 will first give a brief overlook of the reaction of CCP after the 20th Congress of CPSU, which contained several meetings in the central decision making, that eventually led to the empower of "individual line". Then Chapter 2 will analyze the CCP's recognition of the reform in Poland, and the commitment of CCP in Polish crisis together with CPSU. Chapter 3 will introduce the involvement of CCP in Hungarian revolt, and analyze the decision making of CCP around the issue of whether to use military intervention at the turning point of the revolt. Finally, in the conclusion, several main findings of this study will be concluded.

2. CCP's "individual line" after the 20th Congress of CPSU

CCP's foreign actions in 1956 was underlying on the reaction of the 20th Congress

China", *History Study*, Volume 2, 2005, HABA Kumiko (2007) "the new archive and the study trends of the incident in Hungary, 1956" *Eurasian Studies*, Toyo Shoten, ISHII Akira (2004) "How CCP involved in Hungarian Incident", *Advanced Social and International Studies*, The Department of Advanced Social and International Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, CHEN Jian (2001) *Mao's China and the Cold War* The University of North Carolina Press, Peter Vamos (2006) "Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution" *World War International History Project Working Paper #54* Wilson Centre, ZHU Dandan (2013) *1956: Mao's China and the Hungarian crisis* Cornell East Asia Series.

2) See CHEN Jian (2001) *Mao's China and the Cold War* The University of North Carolina Press, ZHU Dandan (2013) *1956: Mao's China and the Hungarian crisis* Cornell East Asia Series.

of CPSU, which gave a perfect chance to CCP to empower the so called “individual line”. This “individual line”, which will be testified in the later discussion, is conceived to be the fundamental element that formed the outline of the foreign policy.

The reason why the “individual line” is called “individual”, because this line, or policy lied on the perception in which CCP would give an approach to the construction of socialism in China that differed from the Soviet Union, especially in the Stalin's era. Such individual character can be testified most significantly in the meetings of the central politburo of CCP which discussed the political issues of the evaluation of the “critique of Stalin”, and it can also be observed in the articles published on People's Daily, the party's bulletin, and the essay written by MAO Zedong, the *Ten Relations*, which was reported by Mao after these meetings in April 25. All of the meetings, articles and the essay were around the construction of socialism in China in a Chinese way. In this section, I will give a brief look of these meetings and the articles and essay from March 1956 to April, and analyze the character of the “individual line”.

After the “secret speech” in the 20th Congress of CPSU, On March 12th, 1956, an expansive meeting of the central politburo was called, and MAO Zedong announced his explanation of the “critique of Stalin”, which is said, “First, it removed the top of the bottle, but on the other hand, it made a mess”³⁾. “Removing the top of the bottle” means the “critique of Stalin” provided a good opportunity to review the inappropriate policies of Stalinism, especially in the sphere of the construction of socialism, while “making a mess” means it didn't give a fair evaluation to Stalinism. And then, on March 23th, in another meeting which was summoned among the top leaders, aside the swimming pool, Mao listed “four pieces of advice” towards the “critique of Stalin”, which emphasized the fair evaluation of Stalin. These meetings finally formed the official opinion of “critique of Stalin” in an official article published on People's Daily, named with “*On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*”. In this article, Stalin was eventually evaluated as the successor to Lenin for his suppression of the counter-revolutionists and imperialists⁴⁾.

3) *A chronicle of Mao Zedong*, Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee by FENG Xianzhi and FENG Hui, Volume 2, pp545.

4) *People's Daily*, April, 5, 1956.

Furthermore, on April 25th, the essay *Ten Relations*, which contains the points of the emphasis of suppression of the counter-revolutionists and the regulation of the economic and political line, was announced in the top leader's meeting. The purpose of this essay was to make adjustments of the economic and political lines related to Chinese domestic issues, by learning the experience from the socialist construction of Soviet Union. Especially, it stressed the point of the "the principle of the Marxism should be connected to the practice of Chinese domestic issues⁵⁾", which deterred the dogmatism of copying the Soviet Union's model. And that can be conceived of the essence of the "individual line" of CCP.

To be concluded, all of these meetings and articles above were around the fair evaluation of Stalin and the experience of Soviet Union related to the construction of socialism. Instead of a complete denial of Stalin, CCP insisted a "fair" judgement, which especially on the point of suppression of the counter-revolutionists and imperialists. For Mao, Stalin was a "sword" to deal with the enemies.

"About the 20th Congress of CPSU, I just want to talk about one thing. In my opinion, there are two 'swords': one is Lenin, the other is Stalin. Now, Stalin was abandoned by Russians...However, we don't throw this sword away. First, we protect Stalin, and then we criticize his mistakes. So we wrote *On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*⁶⁾."

Meanwhile, as Mao argued in his *Ten Relations*, he also realized the mistakes of Stalinism, and tried to make a regulation for the Chinese practice of socialist construction. The regulations were concluded in "ten relationships". In these "regulation of relationships", the regulation of relations among heavy industry, light industry and agriculture, and the relations between the economic constructions and national defense indicated CCP's intention to improve the living standard of people. And the regulation of relations between CCP and other parties (the democratic parties which are political power recognized by CCP's leadership), aimed to have the non-CCP political powers participated into the construction of socialism⁷⁾.

5) "Ten Relations", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume 7*, Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, People's Publishing House, 1996 the first edition, p42.

6) "A talk in 2rd Plenary Session of 8th CPC Central Committee", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume 5*, People's Publishing House, 1977, pp321-322.

7) "Ten Relations", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume 7*, Party Documents Research

If we capture this stage of CCP's history of the emphasis of its own approach to socialism, which can be called an 'individual line', the character of this line can be concluded into two sides, which are,

- ① The side of "Suppression", which means the absolute dictatorship of the communist party, including the suppression any 'counter-revolutionists' and 'imperialists'.
- ② The side of "Deregulation", which means the adjustment of economic balance, the effort to improve the level of social welfare, the deregulation the control of the speech, the involvement of the non-communist groups.

As Mao wrote in *Ten Relations*, "We must make the effort to initiate all the positive factors and any of the direct and indirect factors, not only in the party and country, but outside party and country as well, to make contribution to the construction of the powerful socialist country"⁸⁾, the goal of the "individual line" was not more than the empowerment of the state, by raising the living standard of people. Part of Stalinism was succeeded, especially the suppression of the "counter-revolutionists", while part of Stalinism was denied because it could not apply to the reality of China's practice. The "individual line" was a compromise of Stalinism with the two sides of "Suppression" and "Deregulation".

3. CCP and the Polish crisis in 1956

While the "secret speech" left a chance to CCP to strengthen their "individual line" peacefully, in Poland and Hungary, it shocked the legitimacy of the communist parties and led to revolt of the labors and citizens. To reversal the negative situation, the communist party of Poland, Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), made the decision of return of Gomulka, a politician who was oppressed under the Stalin's era, and the ousting of Rokossowski and other pro-Soviet top members. And then, such decisions worried Kremlin, and the top leads of Soviet Union flow to Warsaw along an

Office of the CPC Central Committee, People's Publishing House, 1996 the first edition.

8) Ibid, p23.

approaching Soviet force intervention towards Warsaw. In this section, the author analyzes the perspective of CCP towards the adjustment of PUWP, which underlay the decision of CCP's anti-intervention position for Polish issues.

To understand the behavior of CCP in Polish crisis, it is necessary to learn in what sense CCP had recognized the situation of Poland before the crisis, and one of the most effective way to grasp the perception of CCP is through People's Daily, also known as Ren Min Ri Bao (RMRB), the bulletin of CCP, widely read by party cadres and members, and also the common people of China. The analysis of RMRB is widely used in the study of Chinese politics, since such politics usually don't have enough transparency for study, especially in the high level. However, since RMRB is directly controlled by top members of party, and it represents the official voice of the top decisions, we can analyze RMRB to approach the inside of the black box. Especially, in the Polish crisis and Hungary revolt, 1956, because the chief editor of RMRB, WU Lengxi, attended almost all the top meetings of politburo in which top leaders made decisions of the countermeasure against Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary (Wu's memoirs has been widely quoted by the researchers of Poland and Hungary events in 1956), and using RMRB's article as a mean to express the position of CCP was also discussed in the politburo meeting, it is conceived that through the analysis of RMRB, we can approach the top leaders' attitude and the way of recognition towards Poland and Hungary's situation. Instead of statistical analysis of key words, this research mainly analyze the discourse of the articles which introduced the political reform of Poland and Hungary, to grasp the tendency of the recognition towards such countries.

Besides RMRB, this research also gives evidence of the statements of top leaders and the memoirs of persons involved in the decision making, and the chronological table of top leaders, MAO Zedong, the memoirs of SHI Zhe, the interpreter for the Chinese delegation in Moscow, and some others. Although not enough because of the regulation of information, the record documents of Foreign Minister of China from Wilson Centre in Washington will also be given for reference.

To understand the recognition towards Poland, we begin from Poznan revolt in June, which was the very turning point of Polish political reform, and then to the middle and the aftermath of the crisis in October.

After Poznan revolt, from June 28 to October 19, the outbreak of the crisis, CCP

had observed the political adjustment of PUWP and given opinions in RMRB. The viewpoints in the discourse can be concluded in four dimensions, which were the suppression of counter-revolutions and imperialists in Poznan, the adjustment in industrial area and the improvement of people's living standard, the "democracy in political life", the people's Line (Ren Min Zhen Xian), which means the involvement of the wider groups outside PUWP.

It is obviously that CCP's evaluation of PUWP's political reform was quite similar to its own 'individual line' inside China, and it is conceived CCP used the "individual line" as a standard to judge the reform of Polish politics. It is no more than a positive evaluation of it after the 20th Congress of CPSU.

Then when the crisis broke out in October, CCP emphasized the correct of the PUWP's reform again, and based on this observation of PUWP, CCP made the judgment that Poland would not withdraw from the communist camp and decided to counter Soviet Union's intervention to Warsaw. On October 22th night, Mao assembled the politburo meeting to discuss the problem of Poland. After the meeting, Mao met Yudin, the Ambassador of Soviet Union to Beijing, and expressed his opinion towards the situation of Polish event. Mao said, "It seems that Poland will not withdraw from the communist camp and turn to West Camp immediately. If he (Gomulka) wanted to reshuffle the politburo, then let him do it. You'd better recognize the Gomulka's leadership, and work with him, and cooperate with him in an equal sense. If he wants independence and equality, then give it to him. By doing this, you can guarantee him to stay in the framework of communist camp and Warsaw Pact.⁹⁾"

The reason why Mao and other leaders conceived the right of Gomulka can date back to the evaluation of PUWP's political reform, not only in the stage of before-crisis, but in the middle of the crisis and aftermath as well. At the time of politburo meeting in which top leaders were discussing the measure to solve the Polish problems, two reports about the situation of Poland were received. One written by WANG Bingnan, the Chinese ambassador in Warsaw, argued the counter-revolutions occurred in Poland, while the other, written by XIE Wenqing, the reporter of RMRB

9) *A chronicle of Mao Zedong*, Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee by FENG Xianzhi and FENG Hui, volume 3, p16.

in Warsaw, gave the positive view of the situation in Poland. Although Wang was a very talented diplomat and well trusted, CCP's top leaders denied Wang's judgement and supported the reporter's opinion, which evaluated the political reform of Polish positively.

On October 22th, Xie wrote a diagram below:

"My opinion is, that Poland will not withdraw from the communist camp, and the capitalism will not be revived in Poland as well. However, most lines PUWP made, which are supported by most people, are meant to increase the democratic elements in the politics (Now extreme democracy has appeared), and the reform in the economic sphere, which means to give more right to labors...Poland is still a socialist country, and the proletariat are still in power. In economic sphere, socialist elements are still in advantage, and in the diplomacy, Poland still sustains good friendship with Soviet Union. In a word, Poland is trying to construct socialism in according to its own situation.¹⁰⁾"

The CCP's positive judgement of the diagram instead of the ambassador's report, shows its positive view to PUWP's reform. Especially, since the comment, 'Poland is trying to construct socialism in according to its own situation', is so similar to Chinese "individual line", this can be a key point for CCP's top leaders to agree with the report's opinion.

Even in the last stage of the crisis in which the Soviet army still remained a possibility to intervene into Warsaw, CCP's top leaders continued supporting PUWP's political line as they did since Poznan revolt. According to Mao's chronological table, On October 25th, another expansive meeting of politburo was assembled at Zhong Nan Hai, where top leaders discussed the issue of publishing the speech of Gomulka. And then on October 27th, the full text of Gomulka's speech was carried in RMRB¹¹⁾.

In the text of the speech of Gomulka in RMRB, first the Poznan revolt was analyzed, then the reform of PUWP was introduced while the emphasis of the friendship relations between Poland and Soviet Union. Furthermore, it also referred to the opinion of the construction of socialism.

10) LIU Yanshun (2008) *the storm of Poland in October*, World Affairs press, pp124-127.

11) *A chronicle of Mao Zedong*, Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee by FENG Xianzhi and FENG Hui, volume 3, p17.

“To be briefly, in socialism, what is not changed is the abandon of exploitation. However, to achieve this goal, different countries have different ways. It depends on different time and locations. Also, the style of socialism can be multiple. The socialism which was born in Soviet Union (has its style), while the socialism seen in Yugoslavia is also possible. Other any style is of course no problem.¹²⁾”

In this sense, according to this text of speech, Gomulka was aiming to build socialism in Polish style. It reminds of the “individual line” in *Ten Relations*. In *Ten Relations*, it said, “the principle of the Marxism should be connected to the practice of Chinese issues”. The similarity between the text of Gomulka’s speech in RMRB and *Ten Relations*, obviously reflected CCP’s positive evaluation and support of Polish political reform.

To make a conclusion, the evaluation and support of PUWP’s political reform before, in the middle, and after Polish crisis in an “individual line” sense can be observed through CCP’s behavior, and that can be considered the fundamental reason why CCP countered CPSU’s intention to intervene Warsaw. It is conceived that CCP would not expect the doom of the political reform in Poland which was so similar to its own.

4. CCP and the Hungarian revolt in 1956

Unexpectedly, Hungarian revolt broke out right after the almost solve of Polish crisis. As an actor already involved into the East European foreign affair, the delegation in Moscow had to deal with the Hungarian revolt with CPSU together. Although CCP was in a rush to make several important countermeasures in a few days, in this section, we still try to analyze CCP’s recognition towards Hungarian situation around Hungarian to make a full picture of CCP’s decision making.

When Hungarian revolt broke out on October 23th, the Soviet army intervened into Budapest, and new government led by Imre Nagy was established. At this stage of revolt, CCP’s observation in RMRB, just like its observation towards Poland, focused on Nagy’s effort to stabilize the country by cooperating with Soviet Union to suppress the counter-revolutions and imperialists, and improving the living standard

12) *People’s Daily*, October 27th, 1956

of people. It seems that CCP had the same expectation to Nagy as well as Gomulka at that time. It is conceived that this kind of expectation has eventually led to the proposal of “the declaration” to Soviet Union about the assurance of the equity in communist camp (Declaration on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries), and the support of Soviet Army’s withdrawal from Budapest.

However, when on October 30, the revolt which were stabilized once by Soviet army was broke out again, CCP’s attitude turned to support the re-intervention into Budapest while at that moment CPSU wasn’t able to make the consensus whether to intervene again.

According to SHI Zhe, the translator for the Chinese delegation, in the morning of October 30, the delegation received the report by Mikoyan from Budapest which said the counter-revolutions were seriously occurred in Hungary, and then, the delegation members begun to re-considerate about the countermeasures towards the sudden situation. After a long discussion through a whole day, the delegation reached two ways to solve the problem:

“Shaoqi (LIU Shaoqi), Xiaoping (DENG Xiaoping), Jiaxiang (WANG Jiaxiang), Qiaomu (HU Qiaomu) discussed the problem for a whole day, and then thought about two solutions: ‘The first one, let the Soviet army withdraw from Budapest, and leave the government to counter-revolutionists, with the consequence of the massive death of communists which CCP has experienced before: The second one, Soviet army don’t withdraw from Budapest, and suppress the counter-revolutionists. The two solutions both have good effects and bad effects as well.’ All of them discussed for a whole day but still didn’t reach a consensus.”

And then, they made a phone call to Mao in Beijing for the final decision. However, Mao’s opinion was ambiguous and didn’t make a clear position to intervene into Budapest again.

“The chairman (MAO Zedong) said, ‘You can suggest the two solutions to CPSU, and discuss with them.’ His (Mao’s) opinion is lying to intervention, but he said it better wait until the counter-revolutionists appear more to the normal people.”

Then, LIU Shaoqi and DENG Xiaoping in Moscow discussed with leaders of CPSU, and argued to demand CPSU to use force to intervene into Budapest. According to SHI Zhe, Deng said,

"The political power should be controlled first, and the power should not be lost into the hands of enemies."

And then the delegation made such a consensus that "The problem has already been counter-revolution in its essence, we must save it¹³⁾".

From the memoirs of SHI Zhe above, which has already been quoted by the CCP's official historical publication and almost all the researchers studying the China's role in Hungarian revolt, the most significant reason of the decision to demand the intervention is that the top leader of CCP believe that Nagy had failed to suppress the "counter-revolutions" in Hungary that led to the disorder of the society, especially the brutal murders of communists. To be mentioned, the declaration of the neutrality by Nagy was NOT the reason why CCP asked the intervention to Budapest, because the decision was made on October 30, two days before the declaration. According to the historical record of Foreign Minister of China, 109-01038-02, even on November 2, the situation in Hungary was still unclear, the evaluation of Nagy would have be difficult¹⁴⁾. Therefore, CCP's demand of intervention was mostly considered as an emergency measure in its sense.

Finally, on November 4, the Soviet Army intervened into Budapest again until the revolt settled down. On that day, an expansive politburo meeting was assembled in Beijing, and Mao commented on the intervention of Soviet army:

"In Hungary, the old way for the construction is wrong, and new ways must be explored by the comrades of Hungary. We must support them. The incidents of Poland and Hungary force us to think about the problem of China. The 20th Congress of CPSU is very good, because it told everyone that not all things Soviet Union did is right. We should open the mind by ourselves to solve the practical problems of the revolution and construction in China.¹⁵⁾"

This comment indicated China's expectation of Hungary to find a new way, which

13) SHI Zhe, "the incident of Poland and Hungary and the visit to Soviet Union of LIU Shaoqi", in Bai Nian Chao, Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee and Chinese Society of History of Communist Party of China, pp16-17.

14) Wilson Center Digital Archive

<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119971>, PRC FMA 109-01038-02, 1-10.

15) *A chronicle of Mao Zedong*, Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee by FENG Xianzhi and FENG Hui, volume 3, p23.

is applied for Hungary's realistic practice, rather than keep the old ways, which led to the revolt in October. Furthermore, in a conversation between Premier ZHOU Enlai and the Hungarian Ambassador to China, Agoston Szkladan, on November 2, Zhou evaluated the new leader of Hungary, Kadar, and exchanged his opinions of the errors of Hungary under the influence of Stalin.

"When I spoke to Kadar, I said that Hungary proceeded calmly against Comrade Rakosi. Along with pointing out his errors, his achievements were also pointed out at the same time. Comrade Kadar also agreed with opinion."

"Hungary committed some serious errors in the past, under the influence of Stalin. The masses demand that these errors be rectified. But the present leadership has led the masses in the opposite direction.¹⁶⁾"

From this conversation, we can also tell that CCP expected a more fair evaluation of Rakosi, a Stalinist before the Hungarian revolt, in Hungary, and a modification of the lines under Stalin's era. That is nothing more than a Chinese "individual line" in Hungary's vision.

To be concluded, CCP gave Nagy positive expectation until the upheaval broke out again, and as soon as the disorder was not been controlled and threatened the communist regime, CCP decided to demand the second intervention of Soviet army to Budapest. That means that CCP's tolerance of deregulation was absolutely in the framework of the stabilization in a communist regime. CCP's perspective all over the process of the Hungarian revolt had two dimensions, which were the suppression of counter-revolutions and imperialists to stabilize the communist regime, and the modification of the policies under Stalin's era, which included the improvement of the living standard of people. The perspective was a projection of the "individual line" of China itself.

5. Conclusion

In this research, first, though a brief introduction of the politburo meeting of CCP and the analysis of the top leader's work such as *Ten Relations*, the author captured

16) Wilson Center Digital Archive

<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119971>, PRC FMA 109-01038-02, 1-10.

two sides of the 'individual line led by the communist party' of CCP which are considered empowered after the "critique of Stalin". The two sides are the side of "suppression" and the side of "deregulation", and with these two characters, the "individual line" was to serve the construction of the powerful socialist country, including the improvement standard of people. The "individual line" is not more than a compromise of Stalinism, because it still emphasized the suppression against the so-called 'counter-revolutionists' and 'imperialists' defined by CCP.

Secondly, this research tried to observe the connection between the "individual line" and the decision making of CCP in the event of Polish crisis and Hungarian revolt. It finds that CCP's evaluation towards PUWP's political reform underlay the "individual line" of CCP before the crisis (chart 1 below), and this evaluation which was supported just in the middle and after the crisis, convinced CCP that PUWP would not withdraw from the communist camp and eventually CCP countered Soviet Union's intention of military intervention into Warsaw.

Finally, this research has analyzed China's decision making through the Hungarian revolt. The different judgement of the Nagy regime before and after the revolt of October 30 (chart 2 and 3 below), indicated CCP's expectation of a modification of the political line in Hungary and a firm position to sustain the stability and absolute power of communist regime, which were the essence of Chinese "individual line". Nagy was distrusted for the disorder of the communist regime that CCP least tolerated.

By studying the case of Polish crisis and Hungarian Revolt, we can conclude that the underlying factor of CCP's decision in these two events is not more than the two sides of "individual line", rather than the challenge of the authority of CPSU. (The charts below show the fundamental factor of the decision making). CCP's behaviors in these events, shows its strong determination to adapt a more flexible way for the construction to the socialist states, both China itself and the communist camp.

Chart 1

The CCP's perception of Poland (June 28—October)	
CCP's "individual line"	CCP's perception of Poland
Suppression of counter-revolution and imperialism	Suppression of the counter-revolution and imperialism in the Poznan revolt
Rebalance of the industries and the improvement of people's living standard	Rebalance of the industries and the improvement of people's living standard
Cooperation with non-communist party	The "democratization" of political life

Chart 2

The first stage of Hungarian Revolt (October 23—29)	
CCP's "individual line"	CCP's perception of Hungary
Suppression of counter-revolution and imperialism	Cooperation with Soviet Union to stabilize the situation
Rebalance of the industries and the improvement of people's living standard	Making efforts to stabilize the situation to restore the normal life of people
Cooperation with non-communist party	×

Chart 3

The second stage of Hungarian Revolt (October 30)	
CCP's "individual line"	CCP's perception of Hungary
Suppression of counter-revolution and imperialism	× the chaos of situation and the deaths of communists
Rebalance of the industries and the improvement of people's living standard	×
Cooperation with non-communist party	×

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- * Except for specially noted, for example the archives from the wilson center, most of the translations into English are made by the author himself.