

プロジェクト報告

Twelve Warring Peaces or a Multiplex Pacifying Phenomena?: A Work in Progress¹⁾

William R. Thompson

There are a number of ways to explain the diminishment of war frequency in the contemporary era. Perhaps the easiest way to do so is to recommend holding one's breath for a few more decades and see how things work out. Observers have noted before that war seemed to have become so irrational that the practice could be declared obsolete – only to have major warfare break out shortly afterwards. But let us assume that the frequency of some types of warfare are genuinely diminishing. How can we pick among the multiple perspectives offered to account for this development? The safest answer at present is that we cannot choose readily among the many arguments. They are not easy to test; nor have all been subject to an equal amount of testing. However, a different response is that we may not have to choose among the many answers to the war diminishment question. If it can be shown that they are really overlapping emphases on different facets of a general explanation, we might still want to know how much relative credit to bestow on the separate strands but we could abandon the attempt to elevate one over the others unless it can be shown that one is capable of subsuming the others. Such a case can be made for the assertion that one is capable of subsuming the others but first we need to assemble the different parts of the whole before elaborating the claim that one is more holistic than the others. At the same time, we need to proceed with the assumption that no one single variable should be able to account for the variance in the complexities of pacific behavior. A multivariate approach is needed.

1) working paper presented at the Conference on Regional Peace at Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan, November 17, 2018.

A second wrinkle with peace explanations is that their analysis has been overwhelmingly global in scope. That is, most (not all) researchers study universes of nearly 200 nation-states and ask what seems to make them more pacific. There is nothing wrong with this practice. It maximizes the utilization of variation among the cases. But we should not stop with global answers for a question that may work differently in different parts of the world. Global peace explanations are in some respects a world-wide average of what influences state behavior. Yet what works in South America may have little to do with the way Middle Eastern dynamics proceed. “Averaging” the behavior of two disparate regions could lead to misleading global answers. Alternatively, very strong patterns exhibited by one region could work as an outlier to distort global analytical outcomes. Europe and North America are distinctively pacific regions now. They have not always been that way. Nor should we assume that the idiosyncracies of their development trajectories provide paths that other regions can be expected to follow. In short, global analyses need to be paired with regional explorations of pacific behavior. Maybe there is one global answer that fits everywhere or maybe not.

In this paper, we first look at the question of whether there is a common denominator to many of the arguments that have been put forward. We think there is and that it pertains to industrialization processes. Industrialization, for instance, has influenced democratization, border settlements, and trade interdependence. It also competes with these processes as an independent source of influence. Second, after spending some time working at the global level, we begin our examination of the global level outcomes to regional pacific behavior.²⁾ However, our beginning is quite crude and overtly preliminary.

Peace Explanations

Most of the dozen explanations to be identified as explanatory contenders are associated with some kind of “peace.” The type of peace designated often gives some clue as to what the main causal force that is thought to be bringing about peace is –

2) See Antony, Ruigh, and Thompson (2016), Antony and Thompson (2017, 2018), and Antony (2017, 2018).

but not always. In a few cases, I have bestowed adjectives on them for purposes of symmetry. For the present argument, it should suffice to identify the main causal drivers singled out in each peace. Sometimes, there are variations that need to be differentiated. However, it is not my present purpose to either criticize the arguments or to discuss the empirical evidence that has been assembled on their behalf. On the contrary, I will assume that each one has something to offer but none of the dozen are entirely satisfactory.

1. The Long Peace

Gaddis (1987) termed the American-Soviet Cold War a long peace in which great powers did not fight one another.³⁾ The point was not just that the two most powerful states managed to avoid direct combat for an appreciable time. Gaddis argued that earlier periods of great power peace were both scarce and shorter. As a historian, Gaddis did not feel any initial compulsion to explain the phenomena in terms of something resembling a theory. Gaddis (1991), however, takes a stab at a theoretical statement but it is clearly not something with which he is comfortable. He is most at ease with the idea that the two Cold War adversaries “gradually became predictable to each other and... began to breed not contempt but common interests” (Gaddis, 1991: 50). Entangled with this core rivalry learning process was a combination of bipolarity, the threat of nuclear warfare, a form of hegemonic stability predicated on the functioning of two hegemons (the United States and the Soviet Union) operating in their respective spheres, and, finally, the possibility that long cycles of technological unevenness meant that another round of hegemonic warfare was likely to be distant in the future. Ironically, what most threatened this concatenation of processes was the destabilizing triumphant liberalism that emerged with the demise of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. But one could argue that all of the other factors had dissipated as well.⁴⁾

3) See as well Kegley (1991), Lebow (1994) and Saperstein (1991).

4) Over the years, other authors (Siverson and Ward, 2002; Schroeder, 2005) have noted in different ways that the post-1945 long peace has not quite been as unique as it might seem.

2. The Nuclear Peace

A number of observers, of course, have commented on the huge costs that would be associated with an exchange of nuclear weapons. The implications are sufficiently radical for many to feel that international relations after 1945 are much different than what transpired prior to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But that is only one form of the argument that contends that the probable damage that nuclear weapons might wreak mean that nuclear powers are unlikely to employ their weaponry arsenal to the maximum extent if that meant self-extinction or something close to it. A second form of the argument insists that states with a second strike capability in nuclear weapons are reasonably secure from attack by states with nuclear capability. Nuclear proliferation is thus a good thing because it means that more states can come to feel more secure from nuclear attack.

3. The Obsolescence of Great Power War Peace

John Mueller (1989) is associated closely with the argument that great power warfare is like foot-binding and slavery – practices that have out-lived their usefulness.⁵⁾ They no longer are viewed as beneficial activities. Obsolete practices thus become increasingly unthinkable as they lose their perceived utility. The obsolescence was recognized by 1914 – as demonstrated by Norman Angell (1910) – but if not sufficiently acknowledged before the onset of World War I, it had been made obvious by 1918. World War II might have been avoided altogether if it had not been for Adolf Hitler. One of the auxiliary implications of this perspective is that nuclear weapons are redundant in bringing about a great power peace. The peace is predicated on the lack of benefits associated with great power warfare and not the high costs imposed by the latest weapons technology.

But the most obvious criticism of a purely ideational approach to institutional obsolescence is that changes in reigning ideas usually have some relationship to changes in material conditions. Thus, authors such as Kaysen (1990) and Parent (2010) have elaborated how political- economic changes, especially industrialization,

5) See, as well, the related Mueller (2004) which focuses on contemporary manifestations of non-great power warfare as essentially thuggery.

provided the crucial context for subsequent changes in how we think about practices. Still, one wonders if two more bouts of industrialized warfare were not necessary to fully bring home the notion of war's obsolescence for great power warfare? At the same time, it might have been difficult to sell this idea to the people charged with planning for nuclear war in the Cold War era.

4. The Democratic Peace

The democratic peace argument states that the probability of intense conflict, especially war, between two democracies is very low. Precisely why this might be the case remains disputed. Democracies are thought to face greater institutional and political constraints on their foreign policy behavior. Legislative checks and balances and voter disapproval can punish decision-makers who opt for unsuccessful or protracted foreign conflict. A corollary is that democratic decision-making tends to be more transparent than autocratic decision-making which makes it difficult to prepare for or launch wars in secret. Signaling is more straight-forward, just as bluffing is more difficult in democratic political systems. Spirals of intensifying conflict over misperceptions might be less likely as a consequence. An alternative argument is that democratic decision-makers are conditioned to compromise in domestic political negotiations. Hence, democratic decision-makers are inclined to negotiate with, and anticipate negotiating behavior from other democratic decision-makers even though they represent foreign countries. A propensity to negotiate does not preclude conflict but should make it somewhat less probable.⁶⁾

There are caveats and complications with the democratic peace. Since democracies only began to emerge in the nineteenth century, their pacifying effect becomes more observable as we move forward in time. In particular, the effect is more discernible after 1945 than before. The pacifying effects are also more observable for older and more developed democracies than for new and less developed democracies. There may even be some propensity for new democracies to be predisposed to conflictual behavior. More concretely, the likelihood of conflict between democracies and

6) For some of the variations on the democratic peace, see Doyle (1983a, 1983b); Ray (1995), Cederman (2001); Reiter and Stam (2002); Rasler and Thompson (2005).

autocracies is pronounced. Thus, while conflict between democracies (and between autocracies) is diminishing, conflict between opposite regime types tends to increase. Complicating the process even further are the tendencies for established democracies to be industrialized, possess wealthy economies, trade with other democracies, make alliances with them, join international organizations, and reside in the least turbulent region after 1945 (Europe). All of these attributes offer alternative causal reasons for more pacific behavior.

Most of the attention paid to the democratic peace focuses on interstate warfare but some studies (Krain and Myers, 1997) show its application to domestic politics as well. Democracies are less likely than autocracies to become embroiled in internal warfare. But then so are states that are older and possess more affluent economies. The inherent problem with democracy as an explanatory variable is that where it is most effective as a type of political system, it tends to be embedded in a politico-economic context that lends itself to multiple interpretations of what drives what.

5. The Kantian Peace

The Kantian peace is really a variant of the democratic peace.⁷⁾ It encompasses the democratic peace and adds the additional pacifying effects of economic interdependence and membership in international organizations, following Immanuel Kant's predictions from the late eighteenth century, interestingly enough, when none of these processes could be said to operate in any appreciable fashion. The three effects are interactive and combine to create more pacifying tendencies than any one of the three processes alone.

Again, the Kantian peace ostensibly applies most directly to interstate warfare but it also has something of a domestic application. The United Nations organization proved to be easily paralyzed by great power disagreement in the Cold War but peace-keeping missions were able to reduce war propensities in some parts of the world. UN peacekeeping missions, once restricted to interstate conflict, have been increasingly associated, and especially after the end of the Cold War, with peace-making missions in states with internal conflict. To the extent that internal conflict

7) The standard reference is Russett and Oneal (2001).

has de-escalated from its Cold War peak, peace-making missions have been credited with reducing tendencies for intrastate conflict to recur (Fortna, 2008; Goldstein, 2011).

6. The Leading-Power Peace

The leading -power peace is the admittedly synthetic product of Robert Jervis' (2001) presidential address to the American Political Science Association. The peace is organized around a Deutschian pluralistic security community led by a predominant United States.⁸⁾ Extending to the most developed, democratic and affluent states and initially joined in coalition against the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the community links Europe, North America, and Japan in a status quo acceptant group for which warfare within the community is for the most part unthinkable. The anticipated benefits of a belligerent approach to problem resolution are negligible; the anticipated costs, thanks in part to nuclear weapons, are too high. Territorial conquest is too difficult and, in any event, no longer pays off in terms of national prosperity. Therefore, territorial disputes, historically a leading motivation for warfare, are rare within the community.

In general, the community accepts the hierarchical hegemony of its leadership structure, just as it embraces the peace and prosperity that comes with it. Values are similar, compatibility is high and, therefore, disputes, when they occur, tend to be low level in intensity. Democratic identities reinforce the tendency to approach problems with non-coercive techniques. Yet, at the same time, the scope of this peace is clearly restricted to the boundaries of the pluralistic security community.

7. The Capitalist Peace

The multiple variations of the capitalist peace argue that it is underlying economic processes that are most responsible for both democracy and peace.⁹⁾ For the most

8) See Deutsch et al, 1957 and Adler and Barnett (1998) for discussions of pluralistic security communities.

9) See Schneider and Gleditsch (2010); Mousseau (2000, 2002, 2003, 2010); Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal (2003); Gartzke (2007; Gartzke and Hewitt, 2010); McDonald (2009, 2010); Mueller (2010); Rosecrance (2010); Russett (2010) and Weede (2010, 2011) for different variations on, and discussions of, the capitalist peace. Mousseau (2012) applies his version to

part then, the democracy -> peace relationship is either spurious or at least subordinated to the broader capitalism -> peace and prosperity relationship. One contention is that democracy is dependent on development and prosperity for contextual settings that make democratic operations possible. Private sources of information facilitate the development of voter preferences. Elite circulation via electoral processes is aided by commercial opportunities that provides losing politicians with refuges from political defeat. One could add that the expansion of usually moderate middle classes also appears to be dependent on less state control of economic processes. One of the variations on this theme stresses that open economies favor smaller governments that are dependent on raising taxes from its citizens and less likely to intervene in market operations. Constrained governments, other things being equal, are more likely to avoid conflict than less constrained governments.

One strand of argument stresses the nature of interactions between developed capitalist states. Industrialized economies become more alike in form and in their movement away from dependence on control of fixed territorial resources. Two implications follow. If policy differences are less likely, so, too, are policy disputes. If territorial expansion is less efficacious than earlier, it becomes less appealing and, therefore, less a matter for dispute. Add a third emphasis on the increasing integration of globalized financial markets and the constraints on conflict become reduced because of the implications of disrupting one's own markets become more severe. Trade interdependence can work similarly in creating greater incentives for evading disrupting conflict, as well as generating significant political actors who lobby for reducing tensions. Free trade, moreover, reduces barriers to economic interactions which also reduces some of the incentives for conflict.

Another strand is more anthropological in nature. Market-oriented economies create norms that promote contractual obligations based on voluntary commitments, state or legal enforcement of the contracts, and restraints on the use of state coercion for resource-draining foreign policies. The primary focus is placed on activities that contribute to material well-being, subject to mutual cooperation as opposed to zero-sum coercion. States with market-oriented economies are thereby less likely to become involved in conflict or to allow their mutual conflicts to escalate.

domestic politics.

Some capitalist peace theorists prefer to argue that it is capitalism and not democracy that accounts for peace between states that share the right kinds of economic processes. Others argue that it is unnecessary to eliminate regime type influences as long as one realizes that the political sources of pacification are more dependent on the economic setting than the other way around.

8. The Territorial Peace

If territorial disputes are critical to understanding why a majority of conflicts escalate to war, the relative absence of territorial disputes could generate a path to peace that is not necessarily dependent on either economic development or regime types (Gibler, 2007, 2012). A territorial peace could then come about to the extent that states share stable and accepted borders. Authors writing in this vein go even further. States with frequent and intense boundary disputes or, in other words, high external threat, are more likely to develop authoritarian power centralization and large armies than are states with established borders and only limited external threat. Thus, it is argued that the antithesis of powerful, highly centralized states, decentralized democracies, are more likely to emerge in more peaceful environs. If so, their subsequent peaceful foreign policies are more due to the geopolitical settings from which they have emerged than the regime type outcome. Recent research (Tir and Gibler, 2012) claims, moreover, that even increased trade and joint, intergovernmental organizational membership, along with dyadic democratic clusters, can also be traced ultimately to border stability. To the extent that these findings hold up to further scrutiny, it suggests a much different interpretation of the sources of the Kantian peace.

9. The Modernization Peace (Gat's Peace)

Gat (2006) accepts the argument that a liberal, democratic peace constrains interstate warfare within the liberal world but argues that a longer time perspective is needed. Liberal democracy emerged in the nineteenth century both because it was a good idea and because the context for liberal democracy had become more materially facilitative. What had changed contextually was the expansion of trade, finance, industrial production, and wealth. Where this expansion took place, it was possible to break free of Malthusian tendencies for population to overshoot the

resource base. Territory's great economic significance was reduced. Eventually, even the need for raw materials has declined. One consequence is that the potential benefits of war have been greatly reduced in the modern age. What might have been accomplished through conquest in the agrarian age no longer worked as well. Now, the costs of disrupting peace in a highly interdependent world had gradually become too great to foster the notion that major warfare made sense. As the intertwined effects of industrial production, liberalism, and democracy spread and deepened over time, the reluctance to forgo the benefits of peace have also deepened – as have ideas and preferences for and about more pacific approaches.

Hence the democratic peace works not solely because of regime type but because mature democracies function in an industrialized-liberalized setting and would find it difficult to sustain themselves in the absence of such a setting. It is the context that matters as much, if not more, than some of the context's manifestations (liberal democracy, economic interdependence, international organizations). To maintain the benefits of peace, rule-based cooperation trumps conflict and war, at least within the modern world. Interactions between the modern world and places still pre-modern are likely to remain conflictual, and perhaps even more conflictual than in the past when everyone inhabited an agrarian world.

To this core argument, Gat adds seven more factors that contribute further to peaceful tendencies. Military recruitment becomes more difficult as societies become more affluent and less willing to accept sacrifices in standards of living. Urbanization reduces the rural areas long preferred for military recruitment. Fewer children as a function of declining fertility rates can reduce the military recruitment base. As the male/female ratio becomes less asymmetric in favor of males, their natural aggressiveness will become less influential. Changes in sexual mores, in any event, provide more alternatives to aggression to satisfy the restlessness of young males. Finally, the advent of nuclear weapons and the implications of their use add still another channel for discouraging inclinations to go to war with other states possessing nuclear capabilities.

10. The Expanding Empathy/Reason Peace (Pinker's Peace)

Pinker's (2011) long study on the de-escalation of many different types of violence is stronger on the review of the evidence than it is on developing a theory to account

for the phenomena. The theory that is put forward is more oriented to what we usually think of as domestic violence and weakest on interstate violence. He rejects weaponry, resource acquisition, affluence, and religion as significant causal factors and privileges five developments that he believes encourage people to abstain from violence. The first two are fairly familiar to political science. Strong states that monopolize violence discourage the use of force of which the state disapproves. This factor is distinguished as perhaps the major difference between the developing and developed worlds. Governance is equated with consistent law enforcement. If states can convince would-be violence makers that the likely costs of their actions outweigh the benefits, violent activities are less probable. Similarly, the benefits of commercial exchange alter the cost-benefit calculus. Gains from violence have to be compared to the costs associated with the disruption/loss of commerce. Violence should be less likely the more the gains from commerce are valued highly. Whether economic interdependence at the interstate level works the same way it might at the intrastate level is not explored.

Pinker's other three factors are not unfamiliar but their application to interstate warfare trends is even more awkward. Feminization makes violence less likely because women, unlike men, are instinctively drawn to behaviors that do not threaten offspring. Whether women in state decision-making roles make different decisions from men is a familiar problem and one that is difficult to evaluate in male-oriented societies. More useful perhaps is the observation that societies that treat women more fairly tend also to be less violent.

The last two factors emphasize psychology and the acquisition of more cosmopolitan outlooks. As you expand the scope of who you feel sympathy for, it becomes more difficult to attack them. The development of intellectual reasoning powers, the last of the five factors, promotes superior decision-making less tainted by superstition and mythology. Metaphorically speaking, fewer witches burned at the stake also means less violence overall in societies. While it is not difficult to see how this might relate to international relations, the impact of these last three factors is more clearly demonstrated within societies than between them.

11. The Demographic Peace

The demographic adjective encompasses several intersecting processes.¹⁰⁾ One pertains to demographic transitions in which, historically, populations have moved away from large nuclear families that are considered necessary for agricultural production and family welfare to less centralized families with lower death and birth rates as agricultural production becomes less important and more labor efficient. In these demographic transitions, the number and ratio of older and younger people varies. Initially, the proportional number of younger people increase and, later, the proportional number of older people increases. Depending on the availability of exploitable resources, the level of development, and employment options available, expanding the size of the population and working force can be beneficial to economic growth and conflict avoidance. When the alternatives are constrained, social turbulence and violence may be more likely. Aging societies, however, are thought to be more pacific because the soldier recruitment base has diminished in size, governmental expenditures are more likely to be oriented towards welfare as opposed to warfare preparations, and older generations are less likely to view conflict favorably.

Thus, demographic changes have implications for conflict propensities that are qualified by where a society is at a given point in time in terms of its stratified age groups and its range of economic alternatives. Higher conflict probabilities are more likely to give way to lesser conflict probabilities as death and birth rates decline, other things being equal.

12. The Industrial Peace

Levy and Thompson (2011) make six general arguments:

1. War co-evolves with other activities, including military and political organization, political economy, threat environment, and weaponry.
2. Major changes in politico-economic complexity, in particular have led to occasional transformations in warfare. Yet, the expansion of warfare is not

10) See, for instance, Birdsall and Sinding (2001), Haas (2007), Jackson and Howe (2008), Sciubba (2011), Cincotta and Doces (2012), and Urdal (2017).

inexorable. An important constraint in the escalation of warfare are its costs which have influenced strongly and negatively the probability of warfare between industrialized states in the contemporary era.

3. The pace of change/transformations in warfare has significantly accelerated three times – first in the late fourth to early third millennium BCE, then in the last half of the first millennium BCE, and again in the second half of the second millennium CE.
4. The attempt to centralize regional political-military power is one of the major drivers of periods of acceleration and transformation, especially in the third acceleration, which was concentrated in the Western trajectory.
5. Much of the world did not experience the third acceleration directly (other than as targets) and remains more agrarian than industrial. As a consequence, states outside of the western trajectory tend to be weaker, vulnerable to internal warfare, and prone to fight fewer and shorter interstate wars.

Industrialization, thus, reduces eventually the probability of warfare between industrialized states because the costs are too high. The absence of industrialization, on the other hand, encourages internal warfare within non-industrialized states because they have yet to go through the ordeals of intensified industrialized warfare.¹¹⁾

Synthesis

Table 1 takes some liberties with the arguments (but not too much) in order to simplify the nature of their arguments. Once they are reduced in form, they almost synthesize themselves. Figure 1 shows how readily this works. Ten main influences are promoted as most responsible directly for influencing how the costs of war or benefits of peace are perceived: nuclear weapons, democratic dyads, leading power concentration, market culture, economic interdependence, international organizations, stable boundaries, and state strength, demographic transitions, and industrialization.

11) See, as well, Chatagnier and Castelli (2016, 2017) for an alternative argument predicated on the industrialization-conflict relationship.

If we push back the temporal order a bit, it has either been argued, or can be argued, that ten of the twelve are to varying extents dependent on the advent of industrialization.

Table 1 Basic “End of War” Arguments Greatly Simplified

Type of Peace	Argument
1. Long	Nuclear war -> rivalry dampening and less major power war (in part)
2. Nuclear	Nuclear weapons -> less war between nuclear powers
3. Obsolescence	As warfare benefits decline -> warfare considered obsolete and unthinkable
4. Democratic	Joint democracy -> less war between democracies
5. Kantian	Interaction of democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations -> less warfare among members
6. Leading -Power	Peace/prosperity/leadership/nukes/territory less significant -> less major power war
7. Capitalist	Economic changes in culture and production -> (democracy) -> less war
8. Territorial	Stable boundaries -> (democracy) -> less war
9. Gat	Expanding trade, industrialization, finance -> less war within modern world
10. Pinker	Strong states, commerce -> less violence (in part)
11. Demographic	Demographic transitions may lead initially to increased conflict as its population becomes younger but ultimately to decreased conflict as the society ages
12. Industrial	Industrialization reduces the probability of warfare between industrialized states while in its absence states are more likely to be attacked by domestic challengers in the guise of internal warfare.




Figure 1 : The “End of War” Arguments Simplified Even Further

To be sure, all of the authors associated with the twelve peaces summarized in table 1 are unlikely to be equally happy with the order of variable battle arrayed in figure 1. While no one argues that all nine of the intermediate factors are equally important, it is also true that few acknowledge that all of the nine should be included with or without the tenth (industrialization) factor that comes earlier in the causal lineup. Some authors are convinced that some of the nine intermediate variables will prove to be spurious once we control either for other variables in the intermediate list or for the effects of expanded industrialization and trade. Some authors are equally convinced that some of the factors shown in figure 1 do not belong there. It might also be possible that some combination of the ten might work entirely independently of the other variables. Nuclear weapons, stable boundaries, and state strength, for instance, are the least connected to the other five in the nuclear, territorial peace, and state-making literatures and might have separate influences. Yet since no one has yet constructed an empirical test to see how all ten asserted influences might work as an ensemble, it seems premature to worry too much about that at this point. At the most, it would only mean redrawing the line linking the ten

intermediate factors as a set.

Putting aside for the present discussion any consideration of how we might proceed to test these arguments, it is possible to conceptualize how the ten variables might work together to lessen the probability and frequency of some types of warfare. To make this case, one conceivable approach involves falling back on arguments put forward in Levy and Thompson (2011). That study was not initially intended to address “end of war” arguments per se; its purpose was to survey the evolution of warfare from origins to contemporary manifestations and to develop a theoretical apparatus for interpreting the evolution of war. However, any study of the long-term arc of war should be amenable to considering “end of war” arguments.

How do these arguments apply to the twelve uneasy peaces? The Levy-Thompson argument is about co-evolving processes in which a radical change in one of the six areas tends to reverberate through the other five. The second half of the second millennium CE involved significant expansion in world trade, ultimately a transition from an agrarian economy in Europe to an industrialized one, and an upward spiral there in terms of increasingly intensive warfare that led to industrialized warfare and relatively strong states of those states that survived the third acceleration. To participate in, and to survive, the upward spiral states had to become stronger organizations (resource extractors, domestic violence monopolizers, and more closely linked to the loyalties of their populations) than ever before. The costs of warfare in this rendition include the movement towards total warfare, the increasingly expensive weapons platforms and greatly expanded military organizations, and weaponry, such as nuclear warheads, that suggest the futility of full-scale combat between states that possess such armaments. One outcome is that industrialized states continue to fight non-industrialized states but they appear to be much less likely to fight other non-industrialized states. The non-industrialized states that avoided full participation in the upward spiral other than as victims demonstrate different behavior. As relatively weaker states, they are more likely to be vulnerable to intrastate warfare and less able, more generally, to engage in sustained interstate warfare.

Thus, this interpretation produces an independent and differentiated answer to the “end of war” question. Some types of warfare are less probable (interstate warfare between industrialized states, interstate warfare between relatively weak states), albeit for different reasons, while other types (intrastate warfare in the global

South) remain likely. The “end of war” literature tends to focus on either major power warfare or interstate warfare. Yet authors in this genre usually acknowledge that some parts of the world retain belligerent tendencies. Levy and Thompson's (2011) co-evolutionary argument attempts to explain why warfare seems less likely in some parts of the world while it persists elsewhere.

There is nothing in the ten variable mix portrayed in figure 1 that seems strange to the co-evolutionary argument. The expansion of world trade and industrialization, initially centered in Europe between roughly 1500 and 1945, was without a doubt a radical *political-economic* transformation that had implications for other spheres. Going down the intermediate list of seven variables in figure 4, each one can be linked to the radical changes in *political-economy* processes.

Nuclear weapons are a development predicated on applying industrialized science to *weaponry*. They represent a long development in being able to launch increasingly devastating projectiles at enemies that started with spears and evolved into nuclear missiles. We may not know whether nuclear deterrence really works (Modelske and Morgan, 1985; Vasquez, 1991) but most people believe that it does. To the extent that it does constrain full-scale combat between nuclear haves, it could contribute something to a diminished probability of warfare between industrialized states.

The emergence of democratic dyads, of course, depended on democratization processes succeeding sufficiently to bring about political transitions in states (*political organizations*) that were historically more autocratically ruled. Industrialization has always been considered an important link to explaining democratization processes. The process has not been unilinear. All industrialized states have not become democratic. But the consequences of industrialization appear to be important in accounting for both the emergence, deepening, and maintenance of democratization and democracies. No better an authority than the iconic Lipset (1959) argument displayed in figure 2 provides insight on this key linkage. There really should not be any question that industrialization contributed something to democratization.¹²⁾ The real question is whether democracy is merely an outcome of industrialization like

12) The linkages between industrialization and democratization, nonetheless, remain complex and contested. See, among others, Moore (1966); Arat (1988); Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992); Geddes (1999); Przeworski et al. (2000); Boix and Stokes (2003); Haddenius and Teorell (2005); and Inglehart and Welzel (2009, 2010).




Figure 2 : Wucherpfennig and Deutsch's Interpretation of Lipset's Argument

Source : Wucherpfennig, Julian and Franziska Deutsch (2009)

reduced warfare between some types of states or whether it contributes further independent reinforcement of pacific tendencies once in play.

The leading-power phenomenon can be traced to a lineage of lead economies that emerged as the most successful innovators in global commerce and industrialization over the last millennium, but especially after the 1490s (Modelski and Thompson, 1996). Arguably, the existence of lead economies is probably one of the most overlooked *political-economic* factors in end-of-war etiologies. We disagree over how far back to trace this succession of lead economies but there is more agreement on Britain playing this role in the nineteenth century and the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. One of the tasks of these lead powers has been to organize the resistance to aspiring regional hegemony in Europe. The U.S.-led coalition to resist Soviet expansion is the Cold War version of earlier iterations. Whether it is much different than its predecessors, as Jervis argues, or not, it remains a fundamental part of a structured history. Lead economies have been the primary agents in creating radical political-economic transformations. For instance, Britain introduced innovations based on steam and coal while the United States produced innovations based on factory assembly lines, electricity, and petroleum. Technology and technological change does not simply happen. Radical technological change is concentrated in time and space and is manifested most clearly in the successive lead economies – and even more clearly in the more recent leaders than in earlier ones.

Market culture and economic interdependence, both obviously components in the *political-economy* categorization, are a function of expanded trade which, in turn, rests on or has been substantially influenced by increasingly complex divisions of labor brought about by technological (or political-economic) change. Levy and Thompson (2011) does not include a separate factor for culture. Each of the six factors instead is associated with its own culture(s). Market culture, presumably, is clearly associated with the development of expanded participation in trade networks after 1500 and, later, industrialization. Indeed, the linkages between shifts in fundamental political-economic strategies (the supplantment of agrarian practices by industrial practices) and market culture would be extremely difficult to deny.

Economic interdependence is not merely a function of producing commodities that can be exchanged. It also rests on major transformations in our ability to move commodities around the globe more efficiently and more quickly that have been part and parcel of industrialization processes. Again, there should be little question about the linkages between industrialization and increasing economic interdependence. There can easily be questions about the relative power of economic interdependence to constrain warfare propensities. Alternatively, one can certainly question whether economic interdependence operates independently of the other five variables in figure 1 or in tandem (as in the Kantian argument).¹³⁾

International organizations, a form of *political organization*, came into being initially to facilitate economic changes and consequent political problems in the nineteenth century, many of which can be linked directly to industrialization. Some of the earliest international organizations focused on international problems created by the telegraph, new modes of transportation, and trade (Murphy, 1994; Thompson and Snidal, 2000). In addition, the major political organizations, the League of Nations and the United Nations, came into being only in the aftermath of major bouts of industrialized warfare. As it turned out, they were less successful in constraining major power warfare but the United Nations has specialized in contributing to the

13) For an introduction to the various arguments and findings on the relationships of economic interdependence and conflict, see Mansfield and Pollins (2003).

suppression of the recurrence of warfare, between and within states, in the contemporary era.

Stable boundaries are linked overtly to *threat environments*. The more stable the boundaries, the less threatening is the environment, other things remaining equal. There is some linkage to industrialization, although it is not clear just how significant the linkage might be. Movement from an agrarian era to an industrialized one should eventually downgrade the importance of territory and its implications for agricultural productivity. If political-military status can no longer be assured by expanding territorial control, the incentives to seize valuable territory, or to hang on forever to contested territory should decline. Saying that does not mean that everyone will get the message. German and Japanese strategists remained convinced that they needed to control more space (in eastern Europe/southern Russia and Asia, respectively) to survive in competition with other major powers as late as World War II. But, in both cases, the ideational foundation for these notions can be traced back to the nineteenth century when both states were late developers. It is clear that radical transformations which are ongoing and uneven in the first place, like industrialization, are unlikely to have the same effect on everyone at the same time. Gradually, the tendency to hang on to older ideas and sentiments that are no longer encouraged by changing environments should die out.

Still, there are no doubt multiple paths to stable boundaries and diminished external threat. Some geographical places are fortunate and easier to defend than others. The United States, for example, learned to cope with the relatively lesser threats posed by Native Americans, Mexicans, and Canadians. Contrast that threat environment with urbanized areas located close to nomads in Central Asia and the recurrent waves of invasion and occupation that predominated in Eurasian history. Or, consider dueling attachments in the present to Kashmir, the West Bank, or the Spratly Islands. It is not clear that industrialization and trade has or will alter the conflicts associated with these places. Are these primordial exceptions to the “rule?” Or, more likely, do they simply suggest that stable boundaries can result in various ways, some of which are related to radical political-economic transformations while others are not, or are less susceptible.

State strength is an attribute of *political organization*. It only appears in Pinker's argument and is mainly focused on domestic violence. But it appears in Levy and Thompson as an intermediate variable that depended primarily on exposure to the third co-evolutionary acceleration in which trade expansion and industrialization played an important part. States that managed to play leading roles in this acceleration not only became stronger but also made warfare more lethal and more difficult to contemplate. Most of the states that missed out on the acceleration have tended to remain relatively weak and vulnerable to internal warfare while unsuited for sustained, external warfare because the resources to sustain are often lacking. While Pinker's Leviathan certainly predated industrialization and trade expansion, it seems unlikely that one can account for the rise of the modern state without reference to its interactions with economic changes traceable to industrialization and industrialized warfare. This observation only means that some of the arrows in figure 4 should be double-headed.

Finally, demographic processes have been fundamentally modified by industrialization. Large families and high birth and mortality rates were a hallmark of agrarian political economy. Many children were needed to compensate for the high mortality rates of the young, to work the fields, and to provide some welfare for aging parents. Industrialization changed the logic radically. Smaller families were more logical when fields no longer needed to be tended by most of the population. Birth rates fell (and are falling). High mortality rates were addressed by innovations in diet, sanitation, and medicine – all of which benefited from industrialization in multiple ways. If something like a geriatric peace emerges – due to once powerful states with populations simply too old to fight – its principal root cause will be the movement away from agrarian political economies.

Synthesized Theory of Peace Processes and Related Findings

Elsewhere we have reviewed selectively the literature on the transformation related to industrialization that are most pertinent to our disciplinary interests. A synthesized theory of the main processes and effects reads:

1. War coevolves with other activities, including military and political

- organizations, political economy, threat environment, and weaponry. A substantial change in one of the spheres is likely to lead to major changes in some or all of the spheres.
2. Major changes in political-economic complexity (for example, transitions to the predominance of hunting-gathering, agrarian, and industrial production strategies) have led ultimately to major changes in warfare. Military organizations have expanded, weaponry has become more specialized and lethal, more hostile threat environments have emerged, and political organizations have expanded to manage the threat environments, weaponry, military organizations, and the intensified warfare that stems from bigger and more deadly armies clashing.
 3. The escalation of warfare is constrained by rapidly escalating costs of war. The industrialization of warfare led to total warfare, especially in the 1914-45 era, which radically increased its costs. The perceived heightened costs of warfare, therefore, began to reduce the probability of warfare between industrialized states via both material and ideational changes.
 4. Industrialization also increased the demand for raw materials not found in Europe and, at the same time, lowered the transaction costs of trade by making transportation faster and cheaper and accelerated globalization processes. Industrial production required a scale that was sustainable only by finding foreign markets. As barriers to trade diminished and the costs of warfare escalated, participation in trade increasingly had more appeal than territorial expansion. Intensive conflict intervened to put off more widespread preference for trade over warfare to the second half of the 20th century.
 5. In addition, industrialization-generated, domestic economic development expands the proportion of the population with sufficient resources to expect and to demand some form of participation in public decision-making. Alternatively, enfranchisement was gradually extended to groups considered to be significant contributors to economic development or threats to public stability that might threaten economic development. Industrialization thereby contributed significantly early on to democratization and its expansion.

Industrialization, subject to a considerable lag linked to coming to terms with the destructiveness of industrialized warfare, thereby led to a decrease in the probability

of warfare between industrial states, widespread participation in world trade as suppliers, middle men, and consumers, and democratization. Other industrialized-induced derivatives included surplus capital that led to Britain dominating 19th century foreign investment and the United States the clear leader in the 20th century. Global finance led the way in globalization processes creating an increasingly integrated global marketplace for buying, selling, and moving capital.

At the mass level, local communities were integrated into increasingly globalized networks of production and consumption whether they wanted to be or not. Men and increasingly women were displaced from often subsistent, agrarian pursuits and recruited for industrialized labor. Economies became increasingly national in scope as technological change broke down local autonomy. In the process, local ties and attitudes underwent “modernization.” Inglehart, Puanen, and Welzel (2015) characterize this as the “individual-level” basis for peace.

The intensification and diffusion of industrialization also created “generations” of industrializing societies with the early developers (most prominently, Britain and the United States) growing rich and powerful while rivals sought to catch up quickly. World Wars I and II were complex phenomena but one thing they had in common was the way in which they pitted coalitions of early developers against later developers.¹⁴⁾ In World War II, the coalition of later developers were distinguished by their strategies of radical commitment to centralized decision-making and state ownership of economic production. Of course, this distinguishing feature is made hazier by the U.S.S.R.’s membership in the early developer coalition. Nonetheless, communism and fascism shared a commitment to, and overlapping strategies of, catching up quickly with the early developers by harsh and totalitarian centralization schemes.

This brief theoretical overview deserves expansion and elaboration. But our immediate concern is whether there is evidence to support a heavy dose of industrialization in an explanation of peace. Our preliminary analyses find that a state’s level of industrialization Granger causes border settlement with no significant inverse relationship. Industrialization encourages trade openness and democracy, while democracy is related to trade openness and non-agricultural employment.

14) We borrow this argument from Porter (1994).




Figure 3 : Relationships from Granger Causality Testing

Border settlements facilitate democratization while the reverse relationship does not hold.¹⁵⁾ Of course, when we say that X granger causes Y, we are not implying that Y is entirely a derivative of X – only that statistical analysis can be used to establish that X and Y are related and that appears to precede Y in time, rather than the other way around (unless the relationship is reciprocal). These findings, we think, strongly support our theoretical claim for incorporating industrialization into our peace explanations. Most emphatically, these findings are not reason to embrace an “industrialization peace” as superior to other arguments. What is far more likely is that there are multiple and inter-related processes at work. Figure 3 offers one simplification of their inter-relationships.

Interstate conflict tendencies, on the other hand, appear to be a function of industrialization, trade interdependence, and boundary settlements, but not

15) The Granger tests utilize monadic indicators while our examinations of conflict focus on dyadic measures relying on the lowest value in the dyad. Industrialization is based on the percentage of a state’s labor force that is involved in non-agricultural economic activity, such as industry or service-oriented production. We use Polity IV (Marshall and Jagers, 2002) scores of 6 or greater to capture democratic states. In order to measure border settlement for the Granger-causality tests, we utilize data on the percentage of a state’s borders that are settled from the International Border Agreements Dataset (Owsiak, Cuttner and Buck, 2016). Our variable for trade dependence is calculated by summing the bilateral imports and exports between each state in the dyad and dividing by each state’s own GDP.

democratization (which ends up not statistically significant).¹⁶⁾ These findings may not hold up once more variables are examined but, so far, they seem reasonably robust and they may well survive further study. In addition, Antony (2018) has established that network effects appear to be stronger than dyadic relationships. As a discipline, we insist on forcing international relations into dyadic structures despite the often obvious mis-fit. International relations rarely seems to move along the lines of the Noah's Arc mythology with each species entering the boat two-by-two. Network effects, moreover, are an additional reason to pursue regional patterns because that is where they are most likely to be concentrated.

The finding that network effects are stronger than dyadic relationships is also encouraging for regional interpretations because regions are essentially perceived bundles of network effects in their own rights. The question in this case is just where the network boundaries should be drawn. It seems unlikely that these effects would be genuinely global in scope. Regional network effects seem far more probable. But our efforts to apply the global relationships to regional applications has not preceded all that far. So far, we can say that they appear to be applicable but it is quite possible that they will not suffice to differentiate how region X varies from region Y.

A Preliminary Look at Comparative Regional Processes

Figure 4 compares 5 admittedly gross "regions" (relying on Correlates of War definitions) on the extent to which agricultural employment, our best indicator of industrialization, works at the regional level.¹⁷⁾ Agrarian employment remained fairly high in all 5 regions through about World War II. Rapid acceleration in de-agrarianization after World War II (or perhaps just before) is associated with Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East. Asia and Africa clearly lag with relatively high values persisting into the 21st century. Nonetheless, Asian de-agrarianization has been trending downward since the last quarter of the 19th

16) We have not yet examined domestic conflict propensities but plan to do so.

17) The problem with the COW regional definitions is that they tend to encompass multiple regions. "The Americas," for instance includes North, Central, and South America plus the Caribbean. It seems fair to suggest that few scholars would anticipate many generalizations pertaining to any one of the four zones would necessarily apply to the other three.




Figure 4 : Agricultural Employment by Region Over Time

century. African de-agrarianization seems to have moved in two phases but that probably speaks more to data imperfections and the greater availability of data after independence. African de-agrarianization proceeds along the same rough trajectory as the other regions but remains quite high in the early 21st century.

Democratization does not fare well empirically as a causal factor in accounting for reductions in global conflict propensities. Nonetheless, we show its regional movements in Figure 5 because we cannot rule out the possibility that it will demonstrate more significant effects in some regions. Here, again, the European and American regions lead the way, with Europe peaking early in the 20th century before returning to a positive trend after World War II. The Americas are relatively stationary after the South American independence from Spain after the Napoleonic Wars. Strong improvement in Polity scores does not take place before the 1970s. Asian scores have very gradually improved but remain quite low. African scores initially trended negatively before reversing and moving positively after the 1980s. Middle Eastern scores are best characterized as demonstratively low with some fluctuation up and down but definitely staying within the autocratic domain.

Figure 6 focuses on border settlement activity. The African tendency, so far, to shun the obvious potential for territorial revisionism in favor of simply avoiding the




Figure 5 : Democratization by Region Over Time




Figure 6 : Border Settlements by Region Over Time

topic gives that region a lead in figure 6 that is only challenged by the long European movement away from boundary conflicts. Yet the other three regions also demonstrate pronounced movements away from boundary disputes with the




Figure 7 : Trade Openness by Region Over Time

Americas, Asia, and the Middle East more or less converging on the two leading regions in the early years of the 21st century. Still, some regions (Africa, Americas, Asia) do not demonstrate much movement in the post-World War II era. Curiously, only the Middle East and Europe –the former is highly conflictual while the latter is markedly non-conflictual - exhibit clearly positive trends in this time period.

One of the interesting sidebars associated with figure 6 is that whatever the appeal of boundary settlements as a mover of interstate peace, there may come a day soon when there are few borders left to negotiate. Of course, boundary settlements are a bit plastic in the sense that once forged, they need not remain uncontested forever. Similarly, some disputes are allowed to lay fallow until it is convenient to resurrect them.

Figure 7 sketches trade openness trends over time.¹⁸⁾ Trends prior to World War I are less pronounced with only Asian trade moving up from a very low starting point. The inter-war years are characterized, unsurprisingly, by negative movements.

18) It may be that looking at aggregated dyadic openness is not the best way to tackle regional trade openness. A better indicator might be the extent of intra-regional trade – something that Europe and at least the northern end of the Americas excel at. Asia seems to be moving in that direction as well.

In the aftermath of World War II, all regions give the appearance of a race towards higher levels of openness. The European region seems to be the leader with the Americas and the Middle East not too far behind. Africa and Asia lag behind but both were moving on a positive trend towards the end of their respective series. Nonetheless, the Asian series was trending positive to 1980 and then declined into the early 1990s before resuming an upward movement. This pattern seems the opposite of what one might have expected since Asia was highly conflictual before 1980 (the Chinese civil war, the Korean War, the Vietnamese War, The Sino-Soviet split and fighting in 1969, the Third Indochinese War initially pitting Cambodia against Vietnam but quickly dragging other states into the fray in different ways, and the Sino-Vietnamese War) and much less so after 1980.

Our approach here is avowedly comparative. That is, we would prefer to examine the question of regional peace by contrasting the dynamics of multiple regions – as opposed to looking at a single region in isolation. We make no claim that one approach is superior to the other – only that most analysts seem more comfortable examining one region at a time. That is all the more reason to tackle the less comfortable approach. Moreover, the problem is that the one-region-at-a-time approach makes it difficult to distinguish the idiosyncratic factors from the general ones. But the multiple region approach hardly guarantees a clear comparative answer as to why some regions are more pacific than others.

We need better delineated regions to compare. We also need to go beyond a preliminary eyeballing of the various series. That approach can work with one series but it cannot be done in a multivariate vein. We also anticipated that different patterns would emerge in different regions. Preliminarily, the different patterns seem to be the case. Europe and the Americas adhere most closely to the global pattern, although democratization may fare better in these regions as a pacifying influence than it did globally. Boundary settlement in the Americas also deserves a closer look. In the other three regions, democratization did not seem to contribute much. There are also some questions about the role of trade openness in Asia and Africa. Table 2 summarizes these initial outcomes.

Table 2 Preliminary Applicability of Influences on Regional Inter-state Peace

	Europe	Americas	Asia	Middle East	Africa
Industrialization	Possible	Possible	Possible	Possible	Possible
Democratization	Possible	Possible	Probably Not	Probably Not	Probably Not
Boundary Settlement	Possible	?	Possible	Possible	Possible
Trade Openness	possible	Possible	?	Possible	Probably Not

Again, these “findings” are only preliminary. Our comparative regional thrust has only just begun. There are more arguments and variables to inspect. For instance, the important question of hierarchy, both globally and regionally, has yet to be included in our empirical studies.¹⁹⁾ In this examination, the question is whether popular general explanations possessed any applicability to more narrowly delineated zones. The answer is probably yes, subject to variation in different regions. But this is precisely what one would expect. The bottom line is that we should not expect to find a single “silver bullet” explanation that fits everywhere for all time. Global examinations should reveal general tendencies although they may be heavily influenced themselves by strong regional patterns. Regional examinations should reveal why some influences perform well globally while others do not. Pacification processes are complex and most likely influenced by a variety of factors – some of them may work generally while others could be highly idiosyncratic. The puzzle is to disentangle them appropriately. To coin a phrase, this remains a work in progress.

References

- Adler, Emmanuel and Michael Barnett, eds. (1998) Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2005) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Angell, Norman (2010) The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relationship of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage. London: Heinemann.
- Antony, Alexander (2017) “Industrialization and the Decline of Territorial Ambitions.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California.
- Antony, Alexander (2018) Peacing Together the Peaces: Industrialization and the Rise of Zones of Peace. PhD Dissertation. Bloomington: Indiana University.
- Antony, Alexander, David Ruigh, and William R. Thompson (2016) “An Industrial Peace?” Paper

19) Volgy et al (2018) find that hierarchy, as manifested by the presence of a predominant regional power, is to date the best predictor of regional stability that they have uncovered.

- presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia.
- Antony, Alexander and William R. Thompson (2017) "Industrialization and the Capitalist Peace." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Baltimore, Maryland.
- Antony, Alexander and William R. Thompson (2018) "Industrialization, Territorial Threats and Interstate Conflict." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, California.
- Arat, Zehra F. (1988) "Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited." Comparative Politics 21: 21-36.
- Birdsall, N. and S. Sinding (2001) How and Why Population Matters: New Findings, New Issues," in N. Birdsall, A.C. Kelly and S.W. Sinding, eds., Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Boix, Carles and Susan Stokes (2003) "Endogenous Democratization." World Politics 55: 517-549.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik (2001) "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process." American Political Science Review 95, 1: 15-31.
- Chatagnier, J. Tyson and Emanuele Castelli (2016a) "The Industrial Peace: Schumpeter, Conflict, and the Investment-War Tradeoff." Political Research Quarterly 69, 4: 852-864.
- Chatagnier, J. Tyson and Emanuele Castelli (2016b) "The Arc of Modernization: Economic Structure, materialism, and the Onset of Civil Conflict." Political Science Research and Methods : 1-20.
- Cincotta, R. P. and J. Doces (2012) "The Age-Structural Maturity Thesis: The Impact of the Youth Bulge on the Advent and Stability of Liberal Democracy," in J.A. Goldstone, E.P. Kaufman, and M.D. Toft, eds., Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Arena: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Doyle, Michael W. (1983a) "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, 3: 205-235.
- Doyle, Michael W. (1983b) "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2." Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, 4: 323-353.
- Fortna, Page (2008) Does Peacekeeping Work? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gaddis, John L. (1989) The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gaddis, John L. (1991) "Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future of the International System," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections. New York: Harper Collins.
- Gartzke, Erik (2007) "The Capitalist Peace." American Journal of Political Science 51, 1: 166-191.
- Gartzke, Erik and J. Joseph Hewitt (2010) "International Crises and the Capitalist Peace." International Interactions 36, 2: 115-145.
- Gat, Azar (2006) War in Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Geddes, Barbara (1999) "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" Annual Review of Political Science 2: 115-144.

- Gibler, Douglas M. (2007) "Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues and Conflict." International Studies Quarterly 51, 3: 509-532.
- Gibler, Douglas M. (2012) The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and International Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Haas, M.L. (2007) "A Geriatric Peace? US Security in an Aging World," in J.A. Goldstone, E.P. Kaufmann, and M.D. Toft, eds., Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haddenius, Axel and Jan Teorell (2005) "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence." Studies in Comparative International Development 39: 87-106.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel (2009) "How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know About Modernization." Foreign Affairs 88: 33-48.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel (2010) "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and Democracy." Perspectives on Politics 8, 2: 551-567.
- Jackson, R. and N. Howe (2008) "The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Jervis, Robert (2002) "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace." American Political Science Review 96,1: 1-14.
- Kaysen, Carl (1990) "Is War Obsolete?" International Security 14: 42-64.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., ed. (1991) The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections. New York: Harper Collins.
- Krain, Matthew and Marissa Myers (1997) "Democracy and Civil War: A Note on the Democratic Peace Proposition." International Interactions 23,1: 109-118.
- Lebow, Richard N. (1994) "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism." International Organization 48, 2: 249-277.
- Levy, Jack and William R. Thompson (2011) Arc of War: Origins, Escalation, and Transformation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lipset, Seymour M. (1959) "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review 53, 1: 69-105.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Brian M. Pollins, eds. (2003) Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspective on an Enduring Debate. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Marshall, M. G. and K. Jaggers (2002) "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002." Online: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>
- McDonald, Patrick J. (2009) The Invisible Hand of Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McDonald, Patrick J. (2010) "Capitalism, Commitment and Peace." International Interactions 36, 2: 146-168.
- Modelski, George and Patrick M. Morgan (1985) "Understanding Global War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 29: 391-417.
- Modelski, George and William R. Thompson (1996) Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics. Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press.
- Moore, Barrington, Jr. (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Beacon Press.

- Mousseau, Michael (2000) "Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace." Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, 4: 472-507.
- Mousseau, Michael (2002) "An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation." International Interactions 28: 137-164.
- Mousseau, Michael (2003) "The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence." International Studies Quarterly 47, 4: 483-510.
- Mousseau, Michael (2010) "Coming to Terms with the Capitalist Peace." International Interactions 36, 2: 185-192.
- Mousseau, Michael (2012) "Capitalist Development and Civil War." International Studies Quarterly 56,3:
- Mousseau, Michael, Havard Hegre and John R. Oneal (2003) "How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace." European Journal of International Relations 9,4: 277-314.
- Mueller, John (1989) Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books.
- Mueller, John (2004) The Remnants of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mueller, John (2010) "Capitalism, Peace and the Historical Movement of Ideas." International Interactions 36, 2: 169-184.
- Murphy, Craig (1994) International Organizations and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Owsiak, Andrew P., Alison K. Cuttner, and Brent Buck (2016) "The International Border Agreements Dataset." Conflict Management and Peace Science 35,5: 559-576.
- Parent, Joseph (2009) "Dueling and the Abolition of War." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22,2: 281-300.
- Pinker, Steven (2011) The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking.
- Przeworski, Adam, Jose A. Cheibub, Michael E. Alvarez, and Fernando Limongi (2000) Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rasler, Karen and William R. Thompson (2005) Puzzles of the Democratic Peace: Theory, Geopolitics and the Transformation of World Politics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Ray, James Lee (1995) Democracy and International Conflict. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Reiter, Dan and Allan C. Stam (2002) Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rosecrance, Richard (2010) "Capitalist Influences and Peace." International Interactions 36, 2: 192-198.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Russett, Bruce (2010) "Capitalism or Democracy? Not So Fast." International Interactions 36, 2:
- Russett, Bruce and John R. Oneal (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Saperstein, Alvin M. (1991) "The 'Long Peace'- Result of a Bipolar Competitive World?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, 1: 68-79.
- Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010) Resort to War, 1816-2007. Washington, DC:

- Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Schneider, Gerald and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2010) "The Capitalist Peace: The Origins and Prospects of a Liberal Idea." International Interactions 36, 2: 107-114.
- Schroeder, Paul (2005) "The Life and Death of a Long Peace, 1763-1914," in Raimo Vayrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War: Contending Views. London: Routledge.
- Sciubba, J.D. (2011) The Future Faces of War: Population and National Security. Santa Barbara, Ca.: Praeger.
- Siverson, Randolph M. and Michael D. Ward (2002) "The Long Peace: A Reconsideration." International Organization 56,3: 679-691.
- Thompson, Alexander and Duncan Snidal (2000) "International Organizations." Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol. 5: 692-722.
- Tir, Jaroslav and Douglas M. Gibler (2012) "Rethinking Kantian Peace: Positive Territorial Peace, Dyadic Democracy, Trade, and IGO Memberships." <http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/tir.gibler.022012.pdf>.
- Vasquez, John A. (1991) "The Deterrence Myth: Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear War," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections. New York: Harper Collins.
- Urdal, Henrik (2017) "Peace by Demographic Change," in Elin Bjarnegard and Joakim Kreutz, eds., Debating the East Asian Peace. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press.
- Volgy, Thomas J., Kelly Gordell, J. Patrick Rhamey, and Paul Bezerra (2018) "Conflicts, Regions, and Regional Hierarchies." In W.R. Thompson (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theories. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weede, Erich (2010) "Establishing Global Hegemony by Economic Interdependence." International Interactions 36, 2: 206-213.
- Weede, Erich (2011) "The Capitalist Peace," in Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel Mathews, eds., The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Wucherpfenning, Julian and Franziska Deutsch (2009) "Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited." Living Reviews in Democracy <http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/article/view/Article/lrd-2009-4/1>.